A resurgence of interest in the phenomenology that accompanies the act of retrieval has emerged in the memory literature as a result of an insightful article published by Tulving in 1985. In the paradigm introduced by Tulving and subsequently developed by Gardiner (1988) , the participant is asked to determine the nature of the retrieval experience that accompanies every recognized item in a memory test. If the earlier presentation of an item is recollected vividly by the participant, then the item is given a Remember response. On the other hand, if the participant is certain of having been presented with the item earlier but does not have a conscious recollective experience for it, then the item is given a Know response. Remember and Know judgments appear to be two distinct retrieval states that can be functionally dissociated on a number of different variables. Furthermore, studies have also shown that Remember and Know judgments represent distinct psychological experiences of retrieval that cannot simply be equated with levels of confidence, although they are often correlated (e.g., Gardiner & Java, 1990; Parkin & Walter, 1992; Rajaram, 1993) .
The advantage of using a paradigm that measures the phenomenology of retrieval experience is that it does not equate performance with experience (Tulving, 1989) . Although the participant engaged in the act of retrieval may produce a number of studied items, his or her phenomenologiParts of this research were reported at the 1992 meetings of the Psychonomic Society in St. Louis and at the 1993 meetings of the Midwestern Psychological Association in Chicago. Special thanks are due to H. Branch Coslett for providing experimental resources. I also thank Robert Weisberg for providing access to laboratory space and participants for parts of this research. Kimberly Feldman's assistance in data collection for Experiment 3 is acknowledged. This article benefitted from the helpful comments given by Henry L. Roediger III and Kavitha Srinivas. Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Suparna Rajaram, Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, New York 11794-2500. Electronic mail may be sent via Internet to srajaram@ccvm.sunysb.edu. cal experience of retrieval may vary for these items in systematic ways. An examination of memory performance alone does not provide us with any indication of the accompanying experience, whereas the Remember/Know paradigm does provide a technique for capturing the distinct psychological experiences that accompany such performance (Tulving, 1985 (Tulving, , 1989 . The use of the Remember/Know paradigm has revealed functional dissociations between these judgments in a number of recent studies. Interestingly, a number of variables that produce dissociations between implicit-memory tasks, such as word-fragment completion, and explicit-memory tasks, such as recall and recognition, produce similar dissociations between Remember and Know judgments.
1 On the basis of these similarities in the pattern of dissociations between explicit-and implicit-memory tasks on one hand and Remember and Know judgments on the other, Gardiner and his colleagues (Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner & Java, 1990 Gardiner & Parkin, 1990 ) proposed a systems account in which Remember judgments are presumed to be based on the episodic memory system that uses conceptual processing, whereas Know judgments are considered to arise from the procedural memory system that uses perceptual processing. In a processing account of these dissociations, Rajaram (1993) has similarly proposed that Remember and Know judgments are mediated by conceptual and perceptual processes, respectively. For example, Gardiner (1988) reported that higher proportions of Remember judgments were obtained for semantically encoded words (i.e., words processed for meaning) compared with phonetically encoded words (i.e., words processed for surface-level information), whereas Know judg-ments remained equivalent. 2 Similar dissociations have been reported between conceptual explicit-memory tasks (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) and perceptual implicit-memory tasks (Graf, Mandler, & Haden, 1982; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Roediger, Weldon, Stadler, & Riegler, 1992) .
Such parallels in the dissociations between Remember and Know judgments and explicit-and implicit-memory tasks as well as a selective influence of conceptual variables on Remember judgments and on conceptual explicit-memory tasks have also been observed as a function of generating the to-beremembered items to conceptual cues versus simply reading them (Gardiner, 1988; Jacoby, 1978; Slamecka & Graf, 1978) , full versus divided attention study conditions (Gardiner & Parkin, 1990; Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989; Parkin & Russo, 1989) , age (Craik, Morris, Morris, & Loewen, 1990; Light & Singh, 1987; Parkin & Walter, 1992) , and temporallobe damage (Blaxton, in press ; see Gardiner & Java, 1993, and Rajaram & Roediger, in press , for a detailed review).
Although the parallels between the results for Know judgments and perceptual implicit-memory tasks are less consistent, a selective influence of perceptual variables has indeed been observed on Know judgments (see Gardiner, Gawlik, & Richardson-KIavehn, 1994; Gardiner & Java, 1990; Gregg & Gardiner, 1994; Parkin & Russo, 1993; Parkin & Walter, 1992; Rajaram, 1993) . For example, Rajaram (1993, Experiment 3) demonstrated a selective effect of perceptual fluency on Know judgments in an experiment where masked repetition of test items in the recognition-memory task improved recognitionmemory performance and selectively increased Know judgments while leaving Remember judgments unaffected. On the basis of the evidence presented by Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989) that masked repetition of test items increases the perceptual fluency with which these items are processed, Rajaram argued that the selective increase in Know judgments as a result of this manipulation suggests the influence of perceptual processes on Know judgments.
This experiential analysis of the retrieval process using the Remember/Know paradigm to capture different ways of accessing memories is a recent development in the memory literature (Gardiner, 1988; Tulving, 1985) . However, dual bases for recognition-memory performance have been proposed before (Atkinson & Juola, 1973 ,1974 Jacoby, 1983a Jacoby, , 1983b Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1979 Mandler, , 1980 . Within Jacoby's theory, two independent factors that influence recognition memory were called familiarity and recollection. Familiarity was assumed to be mediated by "data-driven processing" (Jacoby, 1983b, p. 504) or by perceptual variables on the basis of the observation that processing of "physical or graphemic information" (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981, p. 332) in the study material resulted in parallel effects on an implicit-memory task such as perceptual identification and on an explicit-memory task such as recognition memory. The recollective basis of recognition memory was assumed to be influenced by meaningful information or by "conceptually driven processing" (Jacoby, 1983b, p. 504) because variables that engendered conceptual processing (e.g., the levels of processing manipulation) produced dissociative effects between recognition memory and perceptual identification.
In Mandler's (1979 Mandler's ( , 1980 dual-factor theory of recognition memory, the two independent factors mediating recognitionmemory performance were called integration and elaboration. The integrative or familiarity component of recognition memory was presumed to be sensitive to perceptual factors in Mandler's theory as well. Specifically, integration or familiarity was presumed to arise from the organization of "perceptual, featural, and intrastructural aspects of the event," and this process involved the "sensory and perceptual integrations of the elements of the target event" (Mandler, 1980, p. 255) . The elaborative or retrieval component of recognition memory was presumed to be influenced by meaning. Specifically, Mandler reasoned that recall and (the elaborative component of) recognition are mediated by the same retrieval processes and that these processes depend on "interitem relations that define a target event's meaning" (Mandler, 1980, p. 256) . Mandler (1989) also argued that integrative processes (i.e., familiarity) that mediate recognition memory also influence implicitmemory performance, whereas elaborative processes (i.e., retrieval) mediate explicit-memory performance. Thus, the assumptions of dual-process theories of recognition memory (Jacoby, 1983a (Jacoby, , 1983b Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1979 Mandler, ,1980 Mandler, ,1989 and the observed parallels between the dissociations between Remember and Know judgments and explicit-and implicit-memory tasks as a function of perceptual and conceptual variables converge on the same conclusion: Conceptual manipulations selectively influence Remember judgments (or the recollective component of memory), and perceptual manipulations selectively affect Know judgments (or the familiarity component). The experiments reported here were designed to test the claim that Remember judgments are selectively influenced by conceptual variables (e.g., Gardiner & Java, 1993; Rajaram, 1993) . As will be seen, in contrast to this claim, the present findings indicate that perceptual variables influence Remember judgments.
In three experiments, the effects of three different independent variables that would a priori be classified as perceptual manipulations were tested on overall recognition and Remember judgments in a picture-recognition memory task. The motivation for selecting the factors in each of the experiments and the predictions are described separately for each experiment. In Experiment 1, participants studied words and pictures and later made recognition, Remember, and Know judgments for the studied and nonstudied items that were presented in the pictorial format at test. In Experiment 2, the perceptual similarity between study and test items was manipulated by preserving or altering the size of the line drawings of familiar objects. In Experiment 3, perceptual similarity was manipulated by either changing or holding constant the left-right orientation of line drawings of objects across study and test. On the basis of previous findings and theoretical formulations (Gardiner & Parkin, 1990; Rajaram, 1993) , the effects of preserving or altering the perceptual format of the stimuli across study and test should have affected the overall recognition judgments but not the Remember judgments.
Before the presentation of each of the experiments, a note about the assumed relation between Remember and Know judgments and the appropriate analyses of data obtained in this paradigm is necessary to facilitate the description of the experiments. Currently, there is an ongoing debate about the contribution of the two underlying processes that mediate memory performance in explicit-memory tasks. Within different models (e.g., Debner & Jacoby, 1994; Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993; Joordens & Merikle, 1993 3 ), the two underlying influences have been characterized variously as intentional or automatic processes, influence of recollection or familiarity, or conscious or unconscious processes. The argument revolves around the problem of characterizing this relation between the two putative processes that influence the retrieval experience as that of exclusivity, independence, or redundancy (Jones, 1987) . A detailed description of these models can be found elsewhere (see Gardiner & Java, 1993; Jacoby, Yonelinas, & Jennings, in press) . It is sufficient to note here that the point of debate in these models revolves around the contribution of familiarity to memory performance. However, in all three models, Remember judgments presumably represent the recollective component of explicit memory. Because the present research exclusively examines the nature of Remember judgments, it provides pertinent data for all three models that can be used to understand the nature of the recollective component (captured by Remember judgments) in explicit memory.
With respect to data analysis, it should be noted that during the re cognition-memory task participants were asked to make the recognition, Remember, and Know judgments on an item-by-item basis in this paradigm. Thus, if an item was recognized as a studied one, the participant first made a Remember or Know judgment to that item before proceeding to the next one. Thus, a Know judgment was given to a recognized item after the failure to come up with a Remember judgment. Given this procedure, at the level of response assignment, Remember and Know judgments were mutually exclusive (i.e., a given recognized item could be given only a Remember or a Know judgment) and always added up to the total proportion of recognized items. Furthermore, because in this procedure participants first made a recognition judgment to a test item and then decided whether to assign a Remember or a Know judgment, Remember responses constituted a subset of the overall recognition responses given by the participant.
Given the procedure just described, it may not be correct to treat Remember and Know judgments as two levels of a factor (say, response type) while analyzing the findings because these responses are not independent. Because the aim of this research was to investigate the nature of Remember judgments in relation to the overall recognition performance, the analyses here focused on the differential effects of the independent variables on Remember judgments and overall recognition.
Experiment 1
The goal of this experiment was to determine the effect of manipulating the symbolic form (pictures or words) across study and test on recognition memory and Remember judgments in a picture-recognition memory task. When explicit memory for studied pictures and words is tested in a wordrecognition task, the typical picture-superiority effect (i.e., better memory for studied pictures than for studied words) is obtained for overall recognition (Dewhurst & Conway, 1994; Experiment 1; Madigan, 1983; Rajaram, 1993, Experiment 2; Weldon & Roediger, 1987) and is actually amplified for Remember judgments (Rajaram, 1993, Experiment 2) . Because the picture-superiority effect is obtained in conceptual explicit-memory tasks such as recognition and recall and not in perceptual implicit-memory tasks such as word-fragment completion (Weldon & Roediger, 1987) , this effect in Remember judgments provided support for the idea that these judgments are influenced by conceptual factors. Furthermore, recognition memory has been shown to be influenced by both conceptual and perceptual factors (e.g., Jacoby, 1983a Jacoby, , 1983b Mandler, 1980 Mandler, , 1989 , and thus, the amplified picturesuperiority effect in Remember judgments provided strong evidence that Remember judgments selectively capture the conceptual component of recognition memory.
The purpose of this experiment was to find out whether an amplified picture-superiority effect for Remember judgments would be obtained with a picture-recognition memory task. In perceptual implicit-memory tasks, changing the stimulus format at test results in dissociative effects of encoding different symbolic forms. For example, studied words produce significant priming, and studied pictorial counterparts produce little priming on a word-fragment completion task, whereas this pattern reverses in a picture-fragment completion task (Srinivas, 1993; Weldon & Roediger, 1987) . The issue of interest here was to determine whether explicit memory and the accompanying recollective experience would differ for the encoded stimuli (i.e., pictures and words) when the test format of the recognition task changed from words to pictures.
Because the purpose of this experiment was to directly compare the amplified picture-superiority effect on Remember judgments in a word-recognition memory task (Rajaram, 1993 , Experiment 2) with a picture-recognition memory task, the study and test instructions, materials, and procedures (except for the test phase) used here were the same as those reported by Rajaram (1993, Experiment 2) . Participants were presented with words and line drawings of familiar objects at study. At test, all the studied and nonstudied items were presented in pictorial form. The participants' task was to decide which of the line drawings had been presented earlier (regardless of the earlier presentation format) and then to determine which of the recognized items would receive a Remember or a Know judgment.
Because recognition memory has been shown to benefit from the influence of both conceptual and perceptual variables (e.g., Gardiner & Java, 1993; Jacoby, 1983a Jacoby, , 1983b Mandler, 1980 Mandler, , 1989 Rajaram, 1993) , it is reasonable to argue that recognition-memory performance in this task for studied items would benefit both from conceptual processing (greater for pictures than for words) and from perceptual overlap between study and test (also greater for studied pictures than for studied words). Specifically, not only would the study of pictorial format enhance the elaborative or conceptual processing of these items relative to words, but because the studied pictures were later presented in the same format (i.e., pictorial), the picture-superiority effect in overall recognition could have arisen from two sources: conceptual and perceptual sources. If the amplified picture-superiority effect on Remember judgments compared with overall recognition judgments is solely due to a greater influence of conceptual variables on Remember judgments, then unlike the findings reported with the word-recognition memory task (Rajaram, 1993, Experiment 2) , in the present experiment the picture-superiority effect for Remember judgments (presumably arising solely from the influence of the conceptual variable) should be smaller than that for overall recognition (arising from both the conceptual analysis and the perceptual overlap).
Method
Participants. Twenty Temple University undergraduates participated in this experiment for partial fulfillment of course credit.
Design and materials. At study, items were presented either in word or pictorial form. At test, all items were presented in the pictorial form. Thus, the items presented as pictures both at study and at test are considered as items in the same-format condition, and items presented as words at study and as pictures at test belong to the different-format condition.
There were 120 items used in this experiment. All the items were selected from Snodgrass and Vanderwart's (1980) norms with the restriction that the line drawings of all these items yielded 85% or higher name agreement. The word and picture slides for these items were viewed from a distance of 72 in. (182.88 cm). The pictures at study and at test subtended approximately 13° of visual angle.
These items were randomly divided into four sets of 30 items each. At study, 30 items were presented in the word form and 30 were presented in the pictorial form. At test, these 60 items along with the remaining 60 items from the original set (which served as lures) were presented in the pictorial form in a random order. To ensure counterbalancing of items such that each set of 30 items was presented in the word form and in the pictorial form and such that the items were presented as targets and as lures, four study-test list combinations were used.
Procedure. The experiment consisted of three phases-study phase, retention interval, and test phase. In the study phase, participants were presented with 30 words and 30 pictures blocked by item type (where the order of the two blocks was counterbalanced across participants) and were instructed to study these items for a later (unspecified) memory task. These items were presented on slides for 5 s each by a Kodak slide projector with a timer. In the retention interval, participants performed an unrelated task for 15 min in which neither the materials nor the procedure overlapped with the experiment. The retention interval between the study and the test phases was 25 min, which included the time for explaining the instructions for recognition and Remember or Know judgments.
In the test phase, participants made the recognition judgments (yes or no) for each item and the Remember or Know judgments for items that were recognized from the study list. The instructions for recognition and for Remember or Know judgments were taken from Rajaram (1993) and are presented in the Appendix. Participants were asked to respond yes in the recognition task for the pictorial items regardless of whether that item had been presented in the word or pictorial form at study. The experimenter monitored the performance of participants and advanced each slide after all the participants had responded to it. Participants were asked to keep pace with the experimenter, and to ensure this, the experimenter called out the slide number for each slide, and the participants wrote down their recognition and Remember or Know judgments (if applicable) for each slide in their booklets against the appropriate number before moving to the next item. Participants were tested in groups of 1 to 4. The test phase lasted approximately 20 min.
Results and Discussion
The analyses reported in this article follow the logic used by Rajaram (1993) for the statistical analyses of Remember and overall recognition responses (described below). The significance level in this and in all the subsequent experiments was set at the conventional level of p < .05. The data for Experiment 1 are displayed in Figure 1 for the proportion of hits and the proportion of Remember and Know judgments as a function of study conditions and for the proportion of false alarms. The false-alarm rates for Remember (.02) and Know judgments (.09) fell within the respective ranges reported in prior literature.
In overall picture-recognition memory, a significant picturesuperiority effect was obtained such that participants were more accurate in recognizing test items that were presented at study in the pictorial form (.93) compared with items presented in the word form (.67), f(19) = 6.1, SE = 0.04. The data for Remember judgments were analyzed to determine the effects of processing overlap between study and test. A significantly higher proportion of Remember judgments were obtained for studied pictures (.80) than for studied words (.43), giving rise to a picture-superiority effect in Remember judgments, /(19) = 6.92, SE = 0.05. Because participants assign a Know judgment to a recognized item when they fail to give a Remember judgment, the two judgments cannot be considered statistically independent. Therefore, it is more sensible to examine the effects of encoding stimuli on Remember judgments and on overall recognition because the latter includes Know judgments as well.
The picture-superiority effect for Remember judgments (.37) was larger than that obtained for the overall picturerecognition memory (.26 ). This amplification of the picturesuperiority effect for Remember judgments is similar to the pattern reported by Rajaram (1993, Experiment 2) with a word-recognition task. To statistically compare the picturesuperiority effect for Remember judjpnents and overall recognition memory in the present, experiment, a Remember/ Recognition ratio (as suggested in Rajaram, 1993) for the word and picture study conditions was obtained. This technique captures the differential effects of an independent variable on responses assigned to the numerator (Remember judgments) and to the denominator (overall recognition) of the equation in different conditions without posing the problems arising from the treatment of Remember and Know judgments as two This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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Format at Study Figure 1 . The proportion of overall recognition, Remember, and Know judgments as a function of the study conditions on a picture-recognition task. False-alarm data for Remember (R) and Know (K) judgments are also shown. In the left side of the figure, solid ban represent pictures and bars with slanted lines represent words.
levels of a factor in an interaction. The Remember/Recognition ratios were calculated for each participant for studied pictures and for studied words, and the ratios were compared. This ratio for studied pictures (.80/.93) was found to be significantly larger than the ratio for studied words (.43/.67), /(19) = 5.05, SE = 0.05. These Remember/Recognition ratios show that a greater proportion of recognized items were assigned Remember judgments for studied pictures than for studied words. In other words, the increase in Remember judgments from studied words to studied pictures was relatively greater than the increase in overall recognition, leading to a larger picture-superiority effect for Remember judgments than for overall recognition. The results of Experiment 1 with a picture-recognition memory task mirror the pattern of results obtained by Rajaram (1993) with a word-recognition memory task and cannot be easily accommodated within the current theoretical interpretations (Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner & Parkin, 1990; Rajaram, 1993) . Because the increase in Remember judgments for studied pictures relative to overall recognition could arise both from the greater elaborative or conceptual processing entailed in studying pictures and from the perceptual overlap between study and test, these results do not support the notion that Remember judgments are influenced selectively by conceptual factors. The implications of these results, in conjunction with the results from the following experiments, are further discussed in the General Discussion section.
Experiment 2
The aim in Experiment 2 was to examine the effects of size changes in pictorial stimuli on Remember and recognition judgments. Joliooeur and colleagues (Jolicoeur, 1987; Milliken & Jolicoeur, 1992) have shown that recognition memory is adversely affected by changes in the size of pictorial stimuli from study to test. These size-congruency effects (better recognition memory for same-size items than for different-size items) were obtained for unfamiliar shapes such as line drawings of blobs and sticks and for line drawings of familiar objects. Recently, two studies have reported the surprising finding that although size changes across study and test adversely affect recognition memory, this transformation has little effect on perceptual priming as measured by implicitmemory tasks such as object decision (Cooper, Schacter, Ballesteros, & Moore, 1992) or naming (Biederman & Cooper, 1992) . For instance, in the object-decision task, participants decided whether line drawings of novel patterns would be possible or impossible in the real world, where impossible objects violated the three-dimensional properties of objects and the possible objects did not. This task likely requires perceptual operations because participants have to examine the relations among various components of the stimulus to determine whether it is possible or impossible. Further, it is reasonable to assume that changing the size of these stimuli across study and test brings about only perceptual changes in the stimuli. Therefore, the absence of a size effect on the object-decision task was unexpected. The adverse effect of size transformation on recognition memory is also surprising given that the recognition-memory task is more conceptual in nature than the perceptual-priming tasks, and yet surface changes in the stimuli across study and test are detrimental only for the recognition-memory performance.
The previous mappings of the underlying processes between Remember judgments and the conceptual explicit tasks suggest that the effect of changing stimulus size across study and test on Remember judgments should be the same as that observed in recognition memory. Specifically, Remember judg-ments should decline for objects presented in different sizes across study and test when compared with objects presented in the same size across study and test. In contrast, the presumed sensitivity of Remember judgments to conceptual variables indicates that these judgments will not be affected by size changes. Experiment 2 was designed to test these predictions.
Method
Participants. A new group of 32 Temple University undergraduates participated in this experiment for partial fulfillment of a course requirement.
Design and materials. A set of 120 line drawings was selected for use from Snodgrass and Vanderwart's (1980) norms with the restriction that each picture had an 85% or higher name-agreement score. Slides were prepared to create small and large versions of these pictures. The ratio for small to large pictures was 1:1.6 such that from a viewing distance of 72 in. (182.88 cm) at which participants were seated, the small pictures subtended approximately 10.2° of visual angle, and the large pictures subtended approximately 16.5°.
The study list consisted of 30 small and 30 large pictures. At test, the 60 studied pictures were intermixed with 60 nonstudied pictures. In the test list, half of the studied and nonstudied pictures were small in size, and the other half were larger in size such that half of the studied pictures were presented in the same size at study and test (small at study, small at test or large at study, large at test); the other half were different in size across study and test (small at study, large at test or large at study, small at test). The presentation order of large and small pictures in the study and test lists was random with respect to size. Eight study-test list combinations were used to ensure that every item appeared in every condition across participants.
Procedure. One to 4 participants were tested at a time. The experiment consisted of a study phase, a retention interval, and a test phase. In the study phase, each picture was presented for 5 s by a slide projector with a timer, and following Cooper et al.'s (1992, Experiment 1) encoding procedure, participants were asked to decide whether the object faced left or right. Participants were informed about a later (unspecified) memory task but were instructed to simply concentrate on quickly writing down the orientation of the pictures on the sheet of paper given to them. During the retention interval, participants solved word fragments for a nonoverlapping set of materials for 25 min.
Before the test stimuli were presented, participants were given instructions for the recognition and Remember or Know judgments as described in Experiment 1. In addition, participants were told that some of the pictures that they would now see had been presented in a different size at study. They were asked to ignore the size of the objects while making the recognition and Remember or Know judgments. With the distractOT task and the instructions, the time elapsed between the study and the test phase was approximately 35 min. At test, participants were told they did not have to respond within a time limit. The experimenter monitored the performance of the participants and advanced the slides after all the participants in the group had finished making the recognition and the Remember or Know (if applicable) judgments for a given object. As in Experiment 1, for each object the experimenter called the serial number against which participants had to make their recognition and Remember or Know judgments on the answer sheet provided to them. The test phase lasted approximately 20
Results and Discussion
The proportion of correct responses for overall recognition, Remember and Know judgments, and the proportion of false-alarm data are displayed in Figure 2 . The comparison of the study and test conditions was based on stimuli that were presented in the same size at study and test (by collapsing
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S= Same Size D= Different Size across stimuli that were small at study, small at test and large at study, large at test) and on the stimuli that were presented in different sizes at study and test (by collapsing across stimuli that were small at study, large at test and large at study, small at test). Once again, the false-alarm rates for Remember (.03) and Know (.08) judgments were found to be within the ranges reported in prior literature. Overall picture-recognition memory was significantly better for pictures presented in the same size across study and test (.77) than for pictures presented in different sizes across study and test (.72), /(31) = 2.19, SE = 0.02. This finding replicates previous reports of size effects in recognition memory (Biederman & Cooper, 1992; Cooper et al., 1992; Jolicoeur, 1987; Milliken & Jolicoeur, 1992) . For Remember judgments, the pattern of results was similar to that observed in overall recognition memory such that pictures presented in the same size across study and test were given a significantly higher proportion of Remember judgments (.49) compared with the condition where the size of the pictures changed across study and test (.39), t{3\) = 3,6, SE = 0.03.
The size-congruency effect was larger for Remember judgments (.10) than for overall recognition memory (.05). To analyze this result statistically, the logic followed by Rajaram (1993) and reiterated in the Results and Discussion section of Experiment 1 was followed here as well. The Remember/ Recognition ratio was computed for the same-size condition and the different-size condition for each participant to determine the differential effects of the size manipulation on Remember judgments and recognition judgments. A significant difference in the Remember/Recognition ratio was obtained between the same-size (.49/.77) and the different-size (.39/72) conditions, *(31) = 3.03, SE « 0.03. Thus, a greater proportion of recognized items received Remember judgments in the same-size condition compared with the different-size condition, demonstrating that indeed the size-congruency effect was larger for Remember judgments compared with the overall recognition data.
The overall recognition results of this experiment replicate previous findings (Biederman & Cooper, 1992; Cooper et al., 1992; Jolicoeur, 1987; Milliken & Jolicoeur, 1992) . The issue of main interest was the effect of size transformations on Remember judgments. Increased levels of Remember judgments in the same-size condition are consistent with the theoretical claims (Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner & Java, 1990; Gardiner & Parkin, 1990; Rajaram, 1993) that Remember judgments and explicit-memory tasks respond to independent variables in a similar way. However, these results are not consistent with the notion that Remember judgments are selectively sensitive to conceptual variables (Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner & Java, 1990; Gardiner & Parkin, 1990; Rajaram, 1993) if we assume that variations in the size of the stimuli alter only the perceptual and not the conceptual attributes of the studied and tested materials. The implications of these findings are presented in the General Discussion section.
Experiment 3
In this experiment, the effect of another perceptual manipulation, the left-right orientation of objects, was examined because this variable has been shown to produce unexpected effects on recognition memory . Changing the orientation of pictures from study to test does not influence the conceptual processing of these stimuli but could influence the processing of the surface features. On the basis of this assumption, the effects of orientation changes should be obtained on perceptual implicit-memory tasks such as the object-decision task and not on relatively more conceptual tasks such as recognition memory. However, deleterious effects of orientation changes were observed for recognition memory and not for object decision . Thus, orientation changes have similar effects on recognition memory and object decision as do size changes.
In this experiment, effects of reflection transformation on Remember judgments and overall recognition were examined. If Remember judgments are selectively influenced by conceptual manipulations, then orientation changes would not affect Remember judgments. However, if Remember judgments are sensitive to the same factors as conceptual explicit tasks are, orientation effects should be observed on Remember judgments. The results of Experiment 2 suggest that the latter pattern of results is more likely to occur.
Method
Participants. A new set of 32 undergraduates and medical students from Temple University participated in this experiment either for partial fulfillment of course requirement or for pay. The paid and unpaid participants were randomly assigned to the various study-test lists used for counterbalancing materials across conditions.
Design and materials. Ninety-six line drawings of objects were selected from Snodgrass and Vanderwart's (1980) norms with the restriction that each object met the 85% or higher name-agreement criterion and either faced left or right. From a viewing distance of 72 in. (182,88 cm) at which the participants were seated, the pictures subtended approximately 13° of visual angle both at study and at test.
Forty-eight pictures were presented at study where half faced left and the other half faced right. At test, for half of the studied pictures, the reflection across study and test was maintained (left at study, left at test and right at study, right at test), and for the other half, the reflection across study and test was changed (left at study, right at test and right at study, left at test). Thus, at test the 48 studied pictures were intermixed with the remaining 48 nonstudied pictures such that half of the studied and nonstudied pictures faced left and the other half faced right. To ensure that each item was presented equally often as studied and nonsiudied and in the left and right orientation at study and at test, eight study-test list combinations were used. Within the study list and the test list, the order of presentation was random with respect to orientation, study status, or both.
Procedure. Participants were tested in groups of 1 to 3. At study, the pictures were shown by a slide projector with a timer for 5 s each, and the participants were asked to decide whether the object was longer vertically or horizontally. Participants were also informed that some sort of a memory task would follow later but that their task was to concentrate on making the vertical (write V) or horizontal (write H) decisions as quickly as possible because they had limited time. During the distractor phase, participants performed an unrelated task of completing fragments presented in a sentence context for 30 min. These materials were completely nonoverlapping with the other materials used is the experiment.
Immediately after the distractor phase, participants were given instructions for performing the recognition and the Remember or This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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Know judgments following the instructions used by Rajaram (1993) . In addition, they were instructed to ignore the orientation of the objects with respect to the study phase while making the recognition and Remember or Know judgments. In other words, participants were told that even if the orientation had changed, if the same object had been presented in the study phase and in the test phase, their task was to indicate yes for recognition and to make the appropriate Remember or Know judgments. The time that elapsed between the end of the study list and the beginning of the test list was approximately 40 min. The objects were presented one at a time and the remaining procedure during the test phase was similar to that described in Experiment 2.
Results and Discussion
Correct proportions of responses for the overall picture recognition, the Remember and Know judgments, and the proportion of false-alarm data are displayed in Figure 3 . Performance in the same-orientation condition (that included pictures presented facing left at study and at test and pictures presented facing right at study and at test) was compared with performance in the different-orientation condition (that included pictures presented facing left at study, right at test and pictures presented facing right at study, left at test) for recognition, Remember, and Know judgments. The falsealarm rates were found to be within the ranges reported in prior literature both for Remember (.03) and Know (.12) judgments.
For overall recognition, there was a numerical trend in the expected direction as a function of the orientation manipulation such that objects presented in the same orientation at study and test (.85) were recognized better than the objects that were presented in different orientations across study and test (.83). However, this effect was not statistically significant, f(31) = 1.03, SE = 0.02, p = .31. The absence of a statistically significant orientation effect (i.e., better recognition memory for same-orientation pictures than for different-orientation pictures across study and test) fails to replicate the previous findings reported by Cooper et al. (1992) . There was one difference between the procedure in their experiment and the procedure in the present one that may have resulted in the lack of a stronger effect. In Cooper et al.'s left-right orientation experiment, participants were asked to make left-right orientation judgments to the stimuli at study as well (see the Procedure sections in Experiments 1 and 2 in Cooper et al.) . In the present experiment, participants compared the vertical and horizontal length of the stimuli at study. This change in the study task was introduced in the present experiment to keep the study-to-test processing differences roughly equivalent across the size and reflection experiments. That is, in Experiment 2, participants made left-right decisions at study, but the manipulation across study and test involved size change. Given that the manipulation across study and test in the current experiment involved changes in reflection, using left-right orientation judgments at study as well would have introduced more procedural differences between Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 than were necessary. However, this procedure may also have reduced the orientation effect for overall recognition in the current experiment.
The results for Remember judgments clearly produced an effect of orientation. Pictures presented in the same orientation across study and test (.55) were given significantly higher Remember judgments compared with pictures presented in different orientations across study and test (.50), f(31) = 2.41, SE = 0.02. Thus, the orientation effect predicted for the
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Reflection Across Study and Test S= Same Reflection D= Different Reflection Figure 3 . The proportion of overall recognition, Remember, and Know judgments as a function of the same reflection or changed reflection across study and test. False-alarm data for Remember (R) and Know (K) judgments are also shown. In the left side of the figure, solid bars represent same reflection and bars with slanted lines represent different reflection.
overall recognition memory was obtained for Remember judgments. The Remember/Recognition ratios used by Rajaram (1993) and Experiments 1 and 2 in this article were calculated for the same-orientation (,55/.85) and differentorientation (.50/.83) conditions, and the difference between them was found to be significant, /(31) = 2.38, SE = 0.02. This analysis shows that the proportion of recognized items given Remember judgments was significantly greater in the sameorientation condition compared with the different-orientation condition, indicating that the orientation manipulation had a greater effect on Remember judgments than on overall recognition. The presence of an orientation effect on Remember judgments is consistent with the prediction that Remember judgments and explicit-memory tasks are influenced similarly. However, this finding is not consistent with the claim that Remember judgments are selectively influenced by variables that are predominantly conceptual in nature.
General Discussion
Three experiments were conducted to test the claim that conscious recollective experience (measured by Remember judgments) is selectively influenced by conceptual variables. Overall, the pattern of data observed in picture-recognition tasks differed from the results obtained with word-recognition tasks in previous studies. Specifically, contrary to the notion that Remember judgments are selectively influenced by conceptual factors, three different perceptual manipulations affected Remember judgments. In Experiment 1, Remember judgments were significantly higher when the format of the stimuli (picture at study and at test) was preserved compared with the condition where the format was changed (word at study and picture at test). In Experiment 2, the proportion of Remember judgments was higher for line drawings of objects that were presented in the same size across study and test compared with line drawings that were varied in size. In Experiment 3, varying the left-right orientation across study and test reduced the proportion of Remember judgments compared with the condition where the line drawings of objects were presented in the same orientation.
The findings reported in these experiments are inconsistent with the conceptual-perceptual processing distinction embedded in the current theories (Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner & Parkin, 1990; Rajaram, 1993) , and the implications of these findings for these theoretical formulations will be discussed below. In this context, an important factor to keep in mind is that there are several procedural consistencies between the previously reported experiments and the present experiments. The experiments reported here were conducted with the same instructions, general procedure, conditions, and type of participants as were reported in earlier studies (e.g., Rajaram, 1993) .
In resolving the inconsistencies in the pattern of results, one way to reconceptualize the nature of the factors that influence Remember judgments is to return to the instructions given to the participants for making these judgments (see Appendix containing instructions for Remember and Know judgments). The instructions that define Remember judgments emphasize not only the associations from study that come to mind (i.e., the conceptual attributes) but also the perceptual aspects of the study event, such as aspects of the physical appearance of the words (or pictures), a particular association or image, something about its appearance or position, and so forth. In other words, the experimenter did make reference to the perceptual dimensions of the studied information to communicate the importance of the vivid nature of memories for giving Remember responses. Given the nature of these instructions, it is not entirely surprising that perceptual effects are found on Remember judgments. It is also not an accident that these effects have been obtained with pictorial materials because perceptual information is likely to be more informative with pictorial stimuli. This does not preclude the possibility that such effects can also be obtained in tasks with only words. However, it might very well be the case that it is easier to obtain perceptual effects on Remember judgments in pictorial tasks.
There are two theoretical accounts in the memory literature that in some respects at least appear to accommodate the present findings quite well: the encoding-specificity principle (Tulving & Thomson, 1973) and the transfer-appropriate processing principle (Roediger, 1990; Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989) . According to these principles, a stimulus or a processing match between the encoding and retrieval conditions (regardless of whether it is conceptual or perceptual overlap) results in better memory for studied information compared with conditions of mismatch. In fact, the transferappropriate processing principle has successfully predicted the effects of not only conceptual but also of perceptual overlap in explicit-memory tasks in the past (see Blaxton, 1989; Roediger, 1990; Roediger et al., 1989) , and therefore easily accounts for the findings of the present experiments in which the highest proportions of Remember judgments were obtained in conditions that provided stimulus match. However, an additional question raised by the conceptual and perceptual effects on Remember judgments remains to be addressed.
The indication that perceptual dimensions of stimuli influence conscious recollective processes (see also Hunt & Toth, 1990) raises the question as to why these effects have not been obtained in most of the prior literature on the Remember/ Know judgments. The one exception to this pattern is a report of an advantage of low-frequency words relative to highfrequency words on Remember judgments (Gardiner & Java, 1990) . One viable interpretation of the advantage for lowfrequency words in recognition memory is that this effect arises from a greater increase in the perceptual fluency with which studied low-frequency words are processed compared with studied high-frequency words (Jacoby, 1983a (Jacoby, , 1983b Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1979 Mandler, , 1980 . At least on the basis of such accounts, the increased Remember judgments for lowfrequency words cannot be attributed to conceptual variables within the conceptual-perceptual processing framework outlined in the Introduction. Apart from this one rinding, in most of the other studies, perceptual variables such as processing of nonwords (Gardiner & Java, 1990) , masked repetition priming (Rajaram, 1993) , maintenance rehearsal , and modality match (Gregg & Gardiner, 1994) have been shown to increase the proportion of Know judgments, not Remember judgments. Although stimulus match and processing overlap undoubtedly account for the improved explicit-memory performance overall, the remaining question that needs to be addressed is when a conceptual or a perceptual factor would influence the Remember component of explicit memory and when such effects would be obtained for the Know component.
A distinction between factors that induce fluency of processing and factors that provide salient or distinctive information provides a better account of most of the extant data, including the findings reported in the present article, than does the conceptual-perceptual processing distinction proposed in previous studies. The importance of distinctive properties of material in rendering them more memorable has been proposed by others as well (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993) . There is also considerable evidence that fluency of processing improves recognition memory (e.g., Luo, 1993 ; but see Watkins & Gibson, 1988) . Jacoby and Dallas (1981) also describe "distinctiveness of the original encoding of the item" (p. 334) as a determinant of the recollective component of recognition memory, whereas distinctiveness or meaning appears not to influence the familiarity component in their theory. The proposed account draws from all these theoretical claims and is based on the assumption that an analysis of the distinctive or salient attributes of the information, be they conceptual or perceptual in nature, creates memories that are later accompanied by the subjective experience termed as Remember. In general, the effects of perceptual factors on the recollective component of memory have not received much attention (but see Blaxton, 1989; Dewhurst & Conway, 1994; Roediger et al., 1989) . Another assumption in the current proposal is that conditions that enhance the fluency with which to-berecognized information is processed give rise to greater proportions of Know judgments. Fluency may also be generated from perceptual or conceptual factors. Although evidence for the influence of conceptual fluency on Know judgments is not yet available, the influence of perceptual and conceptual fluency on overall recognition memory has been proposed by others as well (e.g., Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989) .
With respect to the influence of multiple attributes on recollection, Cooper et al. (1992) in their account of size and reflection effects on recognition memory argued that "episodic memory relies crucially on access to information about the distinctive [italics added] spatial, temporal, contextual, and semantic aspects of objects." In the current proposal, these properties along with perceptual factors are taken as important dimensions of the stimuli. In fact, Dewhurst and Conway (1994) have also recently proposed that Remember judgments benefit from both sensory and semantic analyses.
As a point of clarification, it should be noted that the distinctiveness-fluency framework is not designed to explain how these two classes of underlying processes combine to give rise to overall memory performance. Rather, it is designed to explain why certain factors influence certain states of subjective experiences at retrieval in different ways. Further, although the experiments reported in this article were designed to test the nature of only Remember judgments, an explanation of the inconsistent results obtained must proceed in light of the previous findings. Therefore, the distinctiveness-fluency framework is proposed to explain not only the present data but also the previously published findings.
The fluency-distinctiveness processing framework accounts reasonably well for both the previous evidence and the data reported in the present article. With reference to the previous evidence that led to the conceptual-perceptual processing account of the dissociations, it is reasonable to argue that semantic encoding of stimuli in the levels of processing paradigm (Gardiner, 1988, Experiment 1; Rajaram, 1993 , Experiment 1), generating target items in the generate-read paradigm (Gardiner, 1988 , Experiment 2), studying pictures (Rajaram, 1993 , Experiment 2), processing information under the undivided-attention condition (Gardiner & Parkin, 1990) , and studying material in the elaborative-rehearsal condition are factors that facilitate the processing of the distinctive and salient aspects of the material. These factors increase Remember judgments and also happen to facilitate distinctive processing that is conceptual in nature.
Similarly, conditions that were reported to increase Know judgments, for example, masked repetition priming (Rajaram, 1993) , maintenance rehearsal at study , processing of nonwords (Gardiner & Java, 1990) , massed repetition (Parkin & Russo, 1993) , and modality match across study and test (Gregg & Gardiner, 1994) , can all be said to increase fluency of processing for the second presentation.
The frequency effects on Remember/Know judgments (Gardiner & Java, 1990 ) that can not easily be accommodated within the conceptual-perceptual processing framework can be easily accommodated within the new proposed framework. It is reasonable to assume that low-frequency words are more distinctive than high-frequency words and that they therefore receive a higher proportion of Remember judgments (Gardiner & Java, 1990) . Some recent data reported by Dewhurst and Conway (1994) also fit well within the fluency-distinctive framework. Dewhurst and Conway reported that the picturesuperiority effect can actually be reversed for Remember judgments when participants are instructed to imagine the pictorial representations of the verbal stimuli. Their results are consistent with the present proposal because imagining the pictorial representations presumably induces distinctive processing of stimuli. In another study, Conway and Dewhurst (1995) asked participants to make Remember/Know judgments for performed, watched, or imagined actions. The Remember judgments were the highest for performed actions and decreased in order for the watched and imagined actions. These findings can also be accommodated within the present framework because the perceptual analyses of the actions would be the highest for the performed actions and would decrease in order for the remaining two conditions. The evidence reported in this article coheres with the earlier data when the fluency-distinctiveness framework is applied. For example, studied pictures are likely to be more distinctive than studied words regardless of the testing format of the items (Experiment 1). Others have argued that different sizes of shapes represent "distinct representations" (Jolicoeur, 1987, p.) in memory. On the basis of models of mental imagery proposed by Kosslyn (1980) and object-representation theory of Shepard (1981) , Joliceour (1987, p. 540 ) supported a representational account of size in which size of objects is represented as a distinct attribute of objects, and different sizes thereby have different representations. With reference to This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
both size and reflection of objects, Cooper et al. (1992) have speculated that these attributes constitute salient and relevant properties of the stimuli used by the episodic-memory system. These accounts fit nicely with the present finding that size and reflection changes influence Remember judgments. Specifically, the size and reflection changes in the pictorial stimuli bring about salient changes in both the perceptual and spatial properties of the stimuli, thereby reducing the vivid quality of the memories for these items. With respect to these changes in size and reflection, Biederman and Cooper (1992) have also suggested that the episodic-recognition system likely relies on the shape as well as on the size, reflection, and orientation of objects, whereas the memories tapped by tasks such as naming rely only on shape information. The processing framework presented here to account for most of the evidence on recollective experience is clearly ad hoc. However, there are various strengths to this proposal. First, much of the data that cannot be accounted for by the earlier theoretical claims can be explained reasonably well within this framework. Second, the prior data that led to the conceptual-perceptual distinction also fit well within the fluency-distinctiveness processing framework. Third, the proposed framework provides us with testable predictions with respect to conceptual, perceptual, spatial, temporal, and contextual factors that may mediate the distinct states of subjective experiences measured in the Remember/Know paradigm. For example, one could hypothesize that a manipulation of distinctiveness in the orthography of verbal information would presumably affect the perceptual dimension of the to-be-retrieved stimuli. According to the framework proposed here, this change should influence the Remember component of explicit memory, despite the changes in the perceptual rather than the conceptual features (Rajaram, 1996) . Fourth, the basic elements of this framework stem from an already available body of evidence and theoretical assumptions that support the fluency basis (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Luo, 1993) and the distinctiveness basis (Hunt & McDaniel, 1993; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) of memory. In the current proposal, these ideas are applied to understand the bases of the subjective experience that accompanies retrieval.
Finally, a theoretical framework that goes beyond the conceptual-perceptual processing distinction or the explicitimplicit task distinction is also useful because both Remember and Know judgments are explicit in nature. In the present use of the Remember/Know paradigm, participants are fully aware of the general temporal and spatial context of the memories receiving either type of judgment. Thus, the similarities between the results from perceptual implicit-memory tasks and Know judgments may turn out to be limited, and differences will likely emerge.
